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Crawford v. Perales3 4
(decided June 2, 1994)
Plaintiff, a public shelter resident, claimed that the state's
failure to provide him certain public assistance allowances,
35
violated his rights under the New York State Constitution.
Further, Plaintiff alleged that certain social service disbursements
violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 36 The Appellate

Division, First Department found petitioner's constitutional

37
claims to be without merit.

The plaintiff, a single male, was living in a public homeless
shelter. 38 As set forth in Social Services Law3 9 and Social
Service Department regulations, 40 the petitioner was entitled to
receive a "home relief' cash allowance of forty five dollars per
month. 4 1 Plaintiff maintained that he was entitled to receive the
same benefits granted to those eligible persons not residing in
public shelters. 42 He further claimed that he should receive a pre34. 205 A.D.2d 307, 612 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Ist Dep't 1994).
35. N.Y. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 1. Article XVII, § 1 provides in pertinent
part: "The aid care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and
by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
37. Crawford, 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
38. Id.
39. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131-1(a) (McKinney 1987). Section 131-1(a)
states in pertinent part: "[S]ocial services officials shall in accordance with the
provisions of this section and the regulations of the department, provide home
relief. . . to needy persons who constitute or are members of a family
household, who are determined to be eligible." Id.
40. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.8[f] (1993). Regulation
352.8[ft provides that: "[A] single person who resides in a shelter for the
homeless who has applied for and is found eligible for home relief must be
paid a cash allowance of $45. . . the remainder of said standard of need is to
be met through the provisions of items of need by the shelter." Id.
41. Crawford, 205 A.D.2d at 307, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
42. Id. at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
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added allowance which amounted to one hundred and twelve
dollars per month, pursuant to New York Social Service Law. 4 3
In addition to the pre-added allowance, plaintiff asserted his
eligibility for an additional fourteen dollars and ten cents for a
"home energy grant." 44 Finally, plaintiff asserted his eligibility
for a "supplemental home energy" grant in the amount of eleven
dollars. 4 5 Plaintiff sought a total of one hundred and thirty seven
dollars and ten cents per month in public assistance. 4 6
Plaintiff alleged that the money distributed pursuant to Social
Service Law section 131 was mandated by the New York
Constitution, 47 thus, the Social Service regulations, concerning
disbursements to residents of public homeless shelters, violated
48
Constitutional mandates.
The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed
petitioner's New York Constitutional claim as being without
merit. 49 The court held that although the New York Constitution
mandated funds for the care of the needy, it does not specify the
particulars of such care. 5 0 In fact, article XVIH provides that such
43. Id. See N.Y. Soc. SERv.LAW § 131-3(a) (McKinney 1987) (allowing
for payments to such "persons and families determined to be eligible... for
home relief... and aid to dependent children").
44. Cravford, 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575. See N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW § 131-3(c) (McKinney 1987). Section 131-3(c) provides in
pertinent part: "[P]ersons and families determined to be eligible by the
application of the standard of need proscribed... shall receive a home energy
grant equal to the following monthly amounts." Section 131-3(a) specifies that
an allowance of fourteen dollars and ten cents a month is allowed for a
household with one person. Id.
45. Crawford, 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575. See N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW § 131-3(d) (McKinney 1987). Section 131-3(d) provides in
pertinent part: "[Piersons and families determined to be eligible by the
application of the standard of need prescribed... after application of
subdivision 3(c) of this section, shall be increased by the following amounts as
a monthly supplemental home energy grant." Section 131(d) specifies that an
eleven dollar allowance is to be provided for a household with one person. Id.
46. Cravford,205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
47. Id. at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
48. Crawford,205 A.D.2d at 307-08, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
49. Crawvford, 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
50. Id. (citing Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 448, 373 N.E.2d 238,
244, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348 (1977)).
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care will be provided "in such manner and by such means, as the
51
legislature may from time to time determine."

In determining the constitutional principles of mandated funds
for the needy as well as legislative discretion, the New York
Court of Appeals in Bernstein v. Toia,52 held that "[t]his
[mandated public assistance] relates ...

to the question of

impermissible exclusion of the needy from eligibility for benefits,
not to the absolute sufficiency of the benefits distributed to each
eligible

recipient.

We

explicitly

recognized... that

the

legislature is vested with discretion to determine the amount of
aid." 53
Plaintiff relied on Thrower v. Perales,54 when it asserted that
the state's policy of denying certain public assistance grants to the
homeless who reside in emergency shelters, represented a
resurrection of a state policy of incarceration of the poor in poor
houses and prisons. 55 In Thrower, the court recognized that New
York's public assistance program of providing cash, goods, and

services accomplished restoring self-care and self-support to the
economically needy and was "a steady transition away from
56
punitive institutionalization of the poor."

The court believed that plaintiff's reliance on Thrower to be ill-

founded. 5 7 In Thrower, the plaintiffs,

also public

shelter

51. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
52. 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977).
53. Id. at 449, 373 N.E.2d at 244, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 349, See In re
Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). "The
appropriation and provision of authority for the expenditure of public funds is
a legislative and not a judicial function, both in the Nation and in the State."
Id. at 439, 330 N.E.2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
54. 138 Misc. 2d 172, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1987). In Thrower, the Supreme Court, New York County granted Medicaid
and Home Relief grants to plaintiffs, who were residents of a New York City
homeless shelter. The court stated that "such [Social Service
Regulation] ... is fundamentally at odds with the non punitive and
rehabilitative policy underlying New York's social welfare laws." Id. at 177,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
55. Id. at 175, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
56. Id.
57. Crawford, 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
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residents, were denied grants under the Home Relief Program. 5 8
"Home relief' are those funds granted "for all support,
maintenance and need, and costs of suitable training in a trade to
enable a person to become self supporting." 59 The program was
instituted to aid poor and destitute persons who did not receive
such assistance from other sources. 60 The Thrower court found
that the refusal to grant funds would deny to the economically
needy the opportunity to restore themselves to self-care and self
support. 61 Such opportunity was held to not be available by the
mere granting of shelter in a public facility. 6 2
New York State justified the denial of such grants by
demonstrating that Plaintiff was provided meals and lodging, as a
public shelter resident, and therefore, was not deprived of, nor
entitled to, cash allowances as an out-of-shelter resident would
be. 63
Plaintiff further alleged that the state's failure to grant him an
amount of public assistance equal to that being received by
persons who did not reside in public shelters, violated his equal
protection rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 64 Plaintiff maintained that the
state's policies would not withstand strict scrutiny by the courts.
Thus, any compelling interest the state may have had as
justification for the reduced allowance to shelter residents, had
not been accomplished by a narrowly tailored means when
65
utilizing the system in place at this time.
58. Thrower, 138 Misc. 2d at 173, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
59. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 157.
60. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 158.

61. Thrower, 138 Misc. 2d at 175, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
62. Id.
63. Crmvford, 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
64. Id.
65. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a denial of equal protection
existed where- a right to vote was conditioned on a poll tax. Justice Douglas'
opinion for the Court stated that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth, or
property, like those of race... are traditionally disfavored." Id. at 668. But
see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). In rejecting an indigent's
challenge to a court filing fee the Supreme Court held that "[n]o suspect
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The Crawford court found that plaintiff's United States
Constitutional claim was without merit. 6 6 The court determined

that suspect classification did not exist based on the fact that a
person received assistance through a homeless shelter. 67
Therefore, it v~as not necessary for the state's funding policy to
withstand strict scrutiny by the courts. The court merely had to
determine that the state funding of homeless shelter residents was

rationally related to a legitimate state interest to "satisfy the
constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause. 68 The

Crawford court found a legitimate state interest, insofar as
persons living in public facilities "receive shelter, food and other
assistance in kind within the shelters which are not provided by
statute to those who maintain themselves in their own homes at
their own expense."69
The Crawford court held that the funds being denied were in
lieu of services being offered by the shelter, and "that it was not

classification, such as race, nationality or alienage, is present.. . . The
applicable standard is that of rational justification." Id. at 660.
66. Cravford, 205 A.D.2d at 309, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
67. Id. at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (citing San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). A suspect class is one having the "traditional
indicia of suspectess: the class is... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such
a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist., 411
U.S. at 28.
68. Crawford, 205 A.D.2d at 308-09, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (citing In re
Davis, 57 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 442 N.E.2d 1227, 456 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1982)).
The court emphasized that:
[I]n the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because classifications made by its laws
are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made
without mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequities.
Id. (quoting Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
69. Id.
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the court's purpose to enable plaintiffs to receive in kind goods
70
and services and full cash allowances."
There seems to be no conflict between applicable state and
federal laws on any of Crawford's claims. Both state and federal
precedent have adhered to those principles utilized by the
Appellate Division, First Department in Crmaford. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that those
classifications based on wealth are not suspect, and as such, state
legislation is subject to mere rational basis scrutiny. 7 1 The
analysis by the Crawford court suggests that New York case law
is consistent with the federal holdings.

SECOND DEPARTMENT
72

Carey v. Cuomo
(decided November 21, 1994)
Plaintiff, a county court judge, alleged that the mandatory
retirement provisions of the New York State Constitution had
violated his federal right to equal protection of the law. 73 The
Appellate Division, Second Department held that Article VI,

70. Id. at 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (quoting Thrower, 138
Misc. 2d at 178, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 937).
71. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In Harris, the Court

rejected an equal protection challenge to a federal statute which prohibited
federal-funds for abortions, despite its acknowledged impact on the indigent.
In addressing that impact, the Court stated "that [this] fact does not itself
render the funding restriction constitutionally invalid, for this court has held
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect class." Id. at 322. See
also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988). The Court, in
answering an indigent's equal protection challenge to a school bus fee stated:
"We have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different
effects on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected
to strict scrutiny." Id. at 455.
72. 619 N.Y.S.2d 646 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).
73. Id.
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